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FALL 1963]
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE UN-UNIFORM ACT
ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY*
A. FREDERICK HARRISt
0 F THE VARIOUS state and territorial jurisdictions which by
judicial decision or statute have admitted into evidence the results
of blood grouping tests,1 a reasonable fascimile of the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity is now in effect in only six, in-
cluding one territory.2 As severally enacted, the Uniform Act betrays
its name. The purpose of this article is to discuss with reference to
the Uniform Act and its purported state counterparts: (1) some cases
in which the Act provides that a blood test shall be taken and (2)
some situations in which the test results will be admitted into evidence
and the effect of such admissibility, if any, upon fact questions.
I.
THOSE CASES IN WHICH THE ACT PROVIDES THAT A BLOOD TEST
SHALL BE TAKEN
This title would, at first glance, appear to be distinguishable from
discussion topic (2) noted above. But the ease with which courts
confound the difference between them (given a little legislative help
in the enacting process) is illustrated by a recent pair of California
decisions.
When the California legislature enacted its version of the Uniform
Act, it omitted the provision that "The presumption of legitimacy of
a child born during wedlock is overcome if . . . the conclusions of all
the experts ... show that the husband is not the father of the child."'
* THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TsSTS To DETERMINE PATERNITY as approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners oni Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association in 1952, is reprinted in the Appendix to this article.
t A.B., 1957, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1961, University of Pennsylvania.
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. See generally 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 165 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1962) ; Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
2. CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. §§ 1980.1-.6; C. Z. CoDE tit. 8, §§ 491-97 (1963); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 522:1-10 (1955); ORE. REv. STAT. tit. 11, §§ 109.250-262(1961) ; PA. SAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 307.1-11 (Supp. 1962) ; UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 9,§§ 78-25-19--78-25-23 (Supp. 1963). Michigan once legislated what it termed "A
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity," which differed significantly
from the Uniform Act and which has been repealed by MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A,§ 9901 (1961), effective Jan. 1, 1963. However, blood tests apparently may be obtained
in Michigan in support cases, see MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 25.496 (1957).
3. UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS To DETERMINE PATERNITY § 5 [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM AT].
(59)
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Discussion of this portion of the statute is topically germane to the effect
upon fact questions, if any, which admissibility of test results would
have, and in that context more anon. However, when a husband at-
tempted to escape child-support liability by introducing not only test
results of his wife and alleged offspring, but also convincing testimony
concerning the unusually long period of gestation (304 days) and the
fact that the wife admitted extra-marital relations, the above-noted
legislative omission inspired an appellate court to observe that this
omission reflected a legislative purpose to restrict the relevance of the
statute to bastardy proceedings.4 Two years later this decision was
again in the fore in an interesting three-party paternity proceeding.
The plaintiff and her (non-party) husband had separated in February,
1953, obtaining an interlocutory decree of divorce in July, 1953. The
child involved was probably conceived in October or November, 1953.
Both plaintiff and her husband testified that sexual relations between
them ceased at the time of separation. However, the husband did con-
tinue to visit the couple's old home allegedly to see their eight-year old
child. Witnesses testified, and plaintiff admitted, that sometimes the
husband stayed until three or four in the morning. There was other
testimony which indicated that other men had also visited the home
throughout this period, but none of the said testimony directly involved
the defendant. Plaintiff maintained that the defendant was the only
man with whom she had had intercourse during this period. Blood
tests showed that the plaintiff's husband could not have been the
father of the child, but that defendant was within the class that could
have been.' Under the California statutes concerning legitimacy 6 it was
arguable that plaintiff's (non-party) spouse fathered the child, and
4. McKee v. McKee, 156 Cal. App. 2d 764, 320 P.2d 510 (1958) (alternative
holding). Compare the corresponding Oregon legislation, infra note 8.
5. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
6. Compare CAL. CODZ CIV. PRO. § 1962(5): "Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent,
is indisputably presumed to be legitimate .... (emphasis added) with CAL. CODE
CiV. PRO. § 1963: ". . . a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce from
bed and board, is legitimate. . . ." and CAL. CIV. CODg § 193: "All children born in
wedlock are presumed to be legitimate." Both latter presumptions are disputable;
the last applies to all children born within ten months of the "dissolution of the
marriage." CAL. CIV. CODE § 194. The cohabitation necessary to invoke the former,
and indisputable, presumption is cohabitation at the time of conception which involves
much more than the mere possibility of access at conception. Kusior v. Silver, 54
Cal.2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960). Recently there has been asserted
a rebuttable common law presumption of legitimacy-arising from the mother's co-
habitation with her husband at the time of conception-by a court which confused this
asserted presumption with the common law rebuttable presumption codified by CAL.
CODe CIv. PRO. § 1963, noted supra. The court then compounded its error by re-
versing a trial court's determination that the presumption had been rebutted when
birth occurred after a divorce, though within the ten month period prescribed by
CAL. CIv. COD § 194. See People ex. rel. Gonzalez v. Monroe, 192 N.E.2d 691 (II.
App. 1963). The California legislation served as the model for similar Canal Zone
provisions, see C. Z. COD tit. 8, §§ 331-333 (1963).
[VOL. 9 : p. 59
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defendant used the first case as a basis for contending that while the Act
applied only in non-filiation proceedings, the omission of the presump-
tion portion of the Act--coupled with the already extant legitimacy
statutes-expressed legislative purpose that the male spouse be saddled
with paternity under the facts in question. The California Supreme
Court rejected this argument, and also expressly disavowed the
"dictum" of the first case that was allegedly to the contrary. The point
here is not to comment upon whether counsel accurately cited these
cases for what they held, nor whether each individual case is decided
correctly under the relevant California law. It is merely to demonstrate
that the cases are not necessarily irreconcilable.
The Uniform Act provides that the court on its own initiative or
upon "suggestion" by anyone whose blood is involved may order blood
tests "In a civil action, in which paternity is a relevant fact. . .."
While some enactments of this language have made minor changes in
phraseology," all enactments correct the unduly restrictive effect of
decisions under less happily-drafted antecedent blood test legislation.
For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an action by a
divorced woman against her ex-husband to have a support order modi-
fied to include a child born after the divorce, held that- the ex-husband
was not entitled to demand a blood test because a support action was
not, in the language of the antecedent statute, a "proceeding to establish
paternity. . . ."' However, as has been noted, the Uniform Act's lan-
guage does not go as far as it could, for if paternity is not a relevant fact
but someone's blood type is, a blood test will not be forthcoming under
7. UNIVORm AcT § 1.
8. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp. 1962) : "In a civil action in
which paternity parentage or identity of a child is a relevant fact . . ." But cf.
ORE. Rzv. STAT. tit. 11, § 109.250 (1961) which provides for blood tests "In a civil
action under ORS 109.110 to 109.230 in which paternity is a relevant fact .. "(Emphasis added.) The italicized statutes apply to proceedings concerning a child
born out of wedlock "or .. .if born alive (which) may be born out of wedlock .... "
9. Commonwealth ex. rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 390 Pa. 551, 136 A.2d 451 (1957)(4-3), interpreting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 306 (1951). (This act was repealed
July 13, 1961.) The holding-that the defense to a child support action raised when
defendant alleges he is not the child's father fails to convert the litigation into "a
proceeding to establish paternity"-has been called "illogical," Comment, 31 TtMP.
L.Q. 397 (1958). It is not illogical, however, if one categorizes the action solely upon
the basis for relief presented by plaintiff. This is exactly the procedure followed, for
example, by a federal court when it is called upon to determine whether or not litiga-
tion presents a "federal question" for purposes of conferring jurisdiction upon a United
States District Court. However, the opinion's reasoning lacked power. It relied heavily
upon Commonwealth v. Stappen, 336 Mass. 174, 143 N.E.2d 221 (1957), in which that
court noted that while prior to enactment the proposed Massachusetts blood test
legislation read: "Whenever it shall be relevant ... to determine the parentage or
identity of any person . . ." it was amended during the enactment process to read
"In any question to determine the question of paternity...." The Massachusetts
court then approved tests on common law grounds. The Pennsylvania court argued
not from legislative history but by legislative analogy, noting that ". . . the Penn-
sylvania legislature employed terms of wider application when it made birth cer-
tificates prima facie evidence of their contents in proceedings in which 'paternity is
controverted." (Emphasis by the court.)
3
Harris: Some Observations on the Un-Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the current phraseology.' ° Perhaps in a case where the Act does not
specifically apply but a plaintiff capriciously refuses to accede to de-
fendant's request for a test, the judge could delay plaintiff's action until
acquiescence."
Contemporary case law has seemingly recognized the availability
of blood tests to a husband who separated from his wife shortly after
the birth of their first child (and before their second child was born)
and who must defend a divorce action which also seeks support for
both children. However, in Commonwealth v. Goldman12 the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court has recently recognized that the broad lan-
guage of the Uniform Act does not entirely sweep away traditional
judicially-formulated doctrines, which therefore remain to interact with
and temper the legislative policy. Consider the Weston"5 case in which,
two and a half years after the birth of their last child, the couple
separated and the wife filed an action for support (but not for divorce)
for herself and for the two children of the marriage. The husband
countered with a demand for blood tests of the two children. In
reversing an order granting the husband's request, the court said:
"Defendants in the heat of these actions should not be provided a legal
vehicle whose chief use will be to embarrass their wives and injure
innocent children. . .. "14 The court held that the husband was
"estopped" from demanding the tests which, upon a first reading of
the Goldman opinion and without further judicial influence, one might
think the husband was entitled to as a matter of right. What the court
actually did here was to protect two analytically separable relational
interests. Aside from the policy of sparing wives' embarrassment, the
court may have forestalled an action which might well have ended any
hope of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be arguable that to
prevent an irreparable family breach is a worthwhile policy particularly
when the future of young children is at stake. If, however, the action
merely is one to increase a support order which accompanied a prior
divorce decree, or if the support action originates after the conclusion
of the divorce proceedings,' 5 the above rationale fails. Further, it has
been argued that an unqualified utilization of the Uniform Act would
10. See Note, 9 RUTGURS L. Rev. 738, 740 (1955).
11. See McDonald, Blood Grouping Tests-A New Act in Pennsylvania, 33 PA.
B.A.Q. 76, 83, 85 (1961) and cases cited therein.
12. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 184 A.2d 351
(1962) (Two judges dissenting) ; 24 U. PirT. L. Rev. 653 (1963).
13. Commonwealth ex rel. Weston v. Weston, 193 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 1963).
(Two judges dissenting.)
14. Id. at 783. But see Weinreb, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. Rev. 1695, 1701(1963): "The policy of holding liable all fathers and exonerating all men who are not
fathers is unquestioned...."
15. See Mund v. Mund, 252 Minn. 442, 90 N.W.2d 309 (1958) (support action
brought four years after divorce; paternity, a litigable issue). See Annot., 65
A.L.R.2d 1381 (1959).
[VOL. 9 : p. 59
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permit familial relationships which have acquired solidified acceptance
to be challenged or disrupted long after the factual beginnings of such
acceptance." This is the second relational interest which the result
reached in the Weston case operates to protect. While it is true that
the majority opinion in Goldman contained a vaguely worded threat
of estoppel in answer to the argument in favor of protecting this second
relational interest, which was advanced by the Goldman dissent, perhaps
it was too-vaguely worded to command respect until the result in
Weston was reached.' 7  In any event, the situation now seems to be
that before successfully seeking a blood test as of right, one must not
only rely upon the statutory language, but also carefully analyze. the
family relationship as it existed for some time prior to the demand for
the blood tests. Absent some judicially-formulated doctrine which
would forbid a litigant in certain circumstances from challenging family
relationships, there seems to be no reason why defendants should not be
allowed to utilize the mechanism of the Uniform Act, inasmuch as
defendants could introduce evidence of blood types fortuitously avail-
able from other sources to prove the same issues.' 8
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 286-89, 184
A.2d 351, 357-58 (1962) (dissenting opinion); Cf. Haugen v. Swanson,. 219 Minn.
123, 16 N.W.2d 900 (1944). The parties were divorced in 1931; action for support
and declaration of legitimacy of purported issue of marriage was brought in 1943.
Court indicates exclusionary blood test results would exonerate husband. See
Sophocles, Oedipus Rex (Rinehart ed., 1955): "Opedipus: With such clues I could
not fail to bring my birth to light. Jocasta: I beg you-do not hunt this out-I beg
you, if you have any care for your own life."
17. Commonwealth v. Goldman, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 283, 184 A.2d 351,.355 (1962).
However, the facts in the Weston case presented unacknowledged though difficult
problems for the court in attempting to apply traditional estoppel concepts. In other
words, in order to use the estoppel concept as a defense, it must be shown that
there was an acknowledgment of paternity on the part of one party to the other,
which extracted a corresponding reliance thereon. Thus, if a defendant husband is
to be estopped from denying paternity, the representation and reliance must interact
between the husband and child. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 22, 11
Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961). See Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 58,3 (1963). On the contrary, the
older of the two children in the Weston case was about four years old at the time
of the support action, making doubtful the presence of any reliance interest. Compare
the child's age in Haugen v. Swanson, supra note 16. Further, the court in the
Weston case observed that defendant's children ". . . were accepted and held out
to the world by him as his children until his wife's personal differences led to a
support action.... ."(Emphasis added.) But see Lyons v. Scott, 181 Cal. App.
2d 787, 5 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1960). The case involved non-defendant husband in
child-support proceedings who, prior to suit, had admitted paternity, paid support
funds on an informal basis through the Probation Office, and who had claimed
the offspring as exemptions for federal income tax purposes. The court held (alterna-
tively) that he was not forbidden to apply for blood tests in a formal support action.
Cf. State v. Carter, 191 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1963) (Presumption of legitimacy of
offspring of plaintiff wife negates estoppel against non-spouse defendant) (by im-
plication) ; Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937). See Annot.,
115 A.L.R. 167 (1938) : "In the birth certificate, the mother caused John Morales to
be named as the father of the child; but this does not raise an estoppel against her. ...
There is no evidence that she led the defendant to believe that this statement was
true.... ." 74 P.2d at 1047.
18. Vecchi, Artificial Insemination and Legitimacy in Pennsylvania, 66 DIcK.
L. Rzv. 1, 5 (1961). The assumption here is that the Uniform Act does not provide
5
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With the exception of certain minor procedural changes tailored
to fit the nature of criminal cases, the Uniform Act provides that "This
act shall apply to criminal cases. . . ."' One immediate issue which sug-
gests itself is whether the availability of blood tests in criminal cases is
limited by the earlier-noted provision that a blood test shall be ordered
only when paternity is a relevant fact. It has been assumed that the
criminal proviso is not so limited.2" This interpretation could lead to
many difficulties because, in some instances, it would be advisable to
have the case labelled a criminal proceeding in order to avoid the prob-
lem of whether paternity must be a relevant fact before a blood test can
be ordered. One purpose for which a blood test can be ordered, where
paternity is not "a relevant fact," is for purposes of impeachment. In
a recent New York case, defendant was indicted for second-degree rape,
which allegedly resulted in prosecutrix's pregnancy. There were multi-
ple acts of intercourse alleged between the prosecutrix and defendant.
In a preliminary statement, prosecutrix swore that she had had rela-
tions with no one other than the defendant. In a jurisdiction providing
for blood tests by statute, though not having the Uniform Act, the trial
judge, noting the absence of compelling appellate authority, held that
the defendant was entitled to have prosecutrix and her child submit to
tests, on the theory that if the results indicated that the defendant was
not the child's father, this would impeach prosecutrix's preliminary
statement, though these same results would not exculpate defendant of
the charge of second-degree rape.2' The trial judge followed an earlier
and very similar California case decided under the Uniform Act,22 a
case which did not, however, consider the problem of whether paternity
had to be "a relevant fact" in a criminal proceeding before a blood test
would be ordered. However, it is submitted that even if the Act is read
so that paternity must be a relevant fact before the test will ensue, never-
theless, on facts close to the two above-noted cases, a request for tests
by defendant should be honored. It may be that where, upon pre-
liminary examination, prosecutrix swears that defendant is the only man
with whom she ever had relations, she may not be lying, but merely
mistaken as to defendant's identity. If this is the case, then the test
results excluding paternity would ipso facto be exculpatory of the crime.
In both the New York and California cases noted above, this seems
unlikely because of the allegations of repeated illicit acts on the part
of both defendants. However, in situations where only one criminal act
the only device for introducing evidence of blood types, but merely supplements those
situations in Which other proof may or may not be obtainable.
19. UNIORm AcT § 6.
20. Note, 9 RUTGgRS L. Riv. 738, 744 and n.54 (1955).
21. People v. Tashman, 36 Misc.2d 1023, 233 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1962) ; 14 SYsAcust
L. RZv. 683 (1963).
22. People v. Bynon, 146 Cal.2d 7, 303 P.2d 75 (1956).
[VOL. 9 : p. 59
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is alleged, the blood test may provide a needed safeguard against mis-
taken identity.
Among the noteworthy cases in which a court might order blood
tests is the situation where the female plaintiff wants the putative father
of her child to submit to tests. Formerly, in view of the fact that a
blood test could not conclusively prove paternity, but only disprove it,
plaintiff's application would be denied. 23 Thus, when a mother sought
damages from the alleged father of her child for breach of a contract
for support, her demand that the defendant submit to a blood test to
further establish his liability was refused. This position is implicit,
though not inexorable, in the light of holdings to the effect that when
a defendant submits to a blood test in the hope that it will disprove
paternity, but his hopes are frustrated by the test results which indicate
the possibility of paternity, the adversary may not then utilize the test
results. These conclusions were reached both under blood test
statutes24 and apart from them.25 This rule of exclusion of evidence,
however, does not prevail under the Uniform Act, as will shortly be
demonstrated, and hence the female plaintiff under the language of
section 1 of the Uniform Act may ask a court to order defendant's
submission to blood tests. Further, Section 1 of the Uniform Act
declares that "If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the courts
may resolve the question of paternity against such party. . . ." In the
ordinary statutory rape case, this could lead to the possibility of a
prima facie finding of guilt. In a situation where the prosecution
may use the test results as evidence of the possibility of paternity, it
may put the defendant in the unpleasant position of either refusing to
take a blood test, risking a finding of paternity against him, or
taking the blood test and, if it does not exclude the possibility of
paternity, having the results introduced against him as evidence of the
possibility that he fathered the prosecutrix's child.
II.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD TEST RESULTS INTO EVIDENCE AND
THE EFFECT THEREOF
Section 2 of the Uniform Act provides for the test-taking pro-
cedure, including provisions for the appointment of experts by the
court itself.26 It is further provided that the party which moved the
23. Flippen v. Meinhold, 156 Misc. 451, 282 N.Y. Supp. 444 (1935).
24. Isham v. Mullally, 15 Wis.2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701 (1961). Freeman v.
Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333, 102 N.E.2d 450 (1951).
25. People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 67 N.W.2d 230 (1954).
26. This is important. If the only testimony is that of an expert chosen by one
of the parties, his evidence of exclusion will not overturn on appeal a contrary finding
FALL 1963]
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court to appoint test-conducting experts may "demand" that other
qualified experts perform additional tests, the results of which shall
also be admissible. However, some procedural questions are left un-
answered: (1) why the non-moving adversary should not likewise be
permitted to demand additional tests when he is unsatisfied with the
originals, and (2) in view of the fact that the court may order the tests
sua sponte, why none of the non-moving parties in this instance has
a similar right. There is, however, a provision that the experts "shall
be subject to cross-examination by the parties. '2 7 Assuming compliance
with the procedural requirements, and the queries are laid aside, one
is then confronted with the question of whether or not the test results
should be admitted into evidence.
Aside from a situation in which the experts "disagree in their
findings or conclusions," in which case "the question shall be sub-
mitted upon all the evidence . . .," section 4 of the Uniform Act pro-
vides for two major contingencies, the first of which declares:
If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as dis-
closed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged
father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall
be resolved accordingly. 2
of paternity, Lyons v. Scott, 181 Cal. App. 2d 787, 5 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1960) (alterna-
tive holding). Before adoption of the Uniform Act in New Hampshire, it was held
in an annulment proceeding that plaintiff-husband's expert could testify as to test
results which were entitled to evidentiary weight. On all the evidence, non-jury
finding of non-paternity was not erroneous; however, expert's testimony was weakened
by informal remarks of another expert as to tentative scientific acceptance of non-
paternity shown by results of particular test administered. Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H.
481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954).
27. The Uniform Act's language seems to contemplate a plurality of experts,
though one expert's testimony was admitted in State ex. rel. Dolloff v. Sargent,
100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955) ; see Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 620, 354 P.2d
668-69 n.5, 7 Cal. Rptr. 140-41 n.5 (1960) ; accord, (under other legislation)
Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959) (sole expert's
exclusionary testimony went unchallenged). The wisdom of the provision providing
for cross examination of experts cannot be over-emphasized, since blood test results
are not quite cut and dried. Cross-examination might point out the less than con-
clusive nature of the particular test administered, or develop evidence of scientific
disagreement as to the significance of its results. The possibility exists that the tests
were inefficiently administered. See Mitulinski v. Mitulinski, 17 App. Div.2d 238,
234 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1962), in which a husband's divorce decree, granted on the
basis of blood test evidence, was upset because: (1) there was no evidence that an
unmarked test tube of blood taken from the umbilicus of the subsequently deceased
infant was in fact the blood tested; (2) two important serum checks which should
have been made were in fact omitted. But see, as to point (1), State ex. rel. Dolloff
v. Sargent, 118 A.2d at 598-99; cf. Wooley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 22 Ill.
2d 413, 176 N.E.2d 757 (1961). There, the litigant seeking to challenge admissibility
of blood test for alcohol content had the burden of showing some irregularity in
the chain of possession of the blood sample. The holding is limited to civil cases;
see Comment, 110 U. PA. L. Rev. 895, 897-98 (1962), which takes the position that
differing criminal and civil standards of proof affect only the weight, not the admissi-
bility, of such evidence. As to Mitulinski's point (2), see Comment, 50 MICH. L.
Rv. 582, 595-96 (1952) which describes three ways in which serum used in blood
tests can be checked for vitality. See also Littell & Sturgeon, Defects in Discovery
and Testing Procedures: Two Problems in the Medicolegal Application of Blood
Grouping Tests, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rgv. 629. 635-43 (1958).
28. UNIFORM ACT § 4.
[VOL. 9: p. 59
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Every jurisdiction that has enacted the Uniform Act has included
the above provision except Utah, which merely provides that: "The
results of the test shall be received in evidence where definite exclusion
of parentage is established, otherwise the results of the tests shall be
inadmissible .. "29 However, it has been held under other blood test
legislation that even where the statute provides for admissibility of
test results, but is silent upon their evidentiary weight, exclusionary
test results would determine the issue."0 It is possible that even the
Utah courts would reach a similar result, even though an argument
could be made that the legislature by omitting the above provision had
some other result in mind.
The Uniform Act provision noted above was adopted to "remedy"
the outrage exemplified by a 1937 California holding which permitted
a finding of paternity in the face of blood tests showing a contrary,
that is, exclusionary, result."' Nine years later this case became a cause
celebre when three physicians testified that Charles Chaplin could not
have fathered Joan Berry's child. The appellate court, nevertheless,
refused to overturn the jury finding that Chaplin could have, and did.32
Even though the experts agree that the test results show exclusion,
it is still possible that a given defendant may be the father. One recent
evidence casebook categorizes this area as one in which the courts
should take judicial notice of exclusionary results. This, however, is
not precisely accurate, inasmuch as mutations do occur making it some-
29. UTAH CODI ANN. tit. 9, § 78-25-21 (Supp. 1963); accord, Wis. STAT. ANN.
tit. 7, § 52.36(3) (Supp. 1963) ; OHIO RXV. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3111.16 (1960);
Compare ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 106-4, § 51 (Supp. 1962), which includes a provision
forbidding disclosure of defendant's refusal to submit to blood tests, with the sanction
provided by the UNIFORM AcT § 1.
30. Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959). Contra,
Miller v. Domanski, 26 N.J. Super. 316, 97 A.2d 641 (App. Div. 1953) (2-1) ; Dictum
to the effect that legislation providing for admissibility of test results unanimously
indicating exclusion of paternity did not thereby provide that tests were to be given
conclusive effect.
31. Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937).
32. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946). Since Holly-
wood refuses to change its morals, the California legislature changed the law by
adopting the Uniform Act, with salutory results. See Associated Press dispatch,
Aug. 7, 1963: "Santa Monica, Cal.-Actor Marlon Brando has been cleared in a
paternity suit lodged by Marie Cui, a Filipino dancer. The dancer's lawyer, Bernard
Cohen, said blood tests showed Brando could not have been the father of her five-
month-old daughter."
33. See MORGAN, MAGUIR9 & W)INSTUIN, CASES ON EvIDENcE 30-31 (1952).
"For a court to declare that these tests are not conclusive would be as unrealistic as it
would be for a court to declare that the world is flat. . . ." Ross v. Marx, 90 A.2d 545,
546 (Co.Ct. 1952), aff'd, 93 A.2d 597 (1952). (Non-paternity upheld on test basis,
but opinion denies tests conclusive effect.) Treating the problem as one of judicial
notice expedites proceedings, inasmuch as the original judicial reversal of jury ver-
dicts ignoring exclusionary test results was to award a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Zammarelli,
17 D & C 229 (1931). But the Uniform Act's provision that the question of paternity
should be summarily resolved according to unchallenged exclusionary test results
should apply at the appellate level, avoiding the need for a new trial. See Common-
wealth v. Coyle, 190 Pa. Super. 509, 154 A.2d 412 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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what less than absolutely certain that test results agreed to as exclu-
sionary always reflect the truth,84 and courts have been careful to
scrutinize such situations carefully when alerted to them."5 But the
Uniform Act's inflexible result when all the experts do agree removes
in this area, what may be said to be the greatest conceptual flaw in the
law of evidence, namely, the sacrifice of probability upon the altar of
less-than-absolute certainty. Undeniably, the Uniform Act has labelled
exclusionary blood tests as falling into the judicial notice category even
though these are not traditional judicial notice situations. But there is
no doubt that more cases will be decided correctly under this mandate
of the Uniform Act than formerly, when blood test results indicating
exclusion of paternity suffered the undeserved evidentiary ignominy of
inadmissibility or disregard by the finder of fact.
Much more difficult, and hence more controversial, is the treatment
of those cases in which the test results indicate with a greater or lesser
degree of probability, but never with the high degree of certainty that
accompanies an exclusionary result, that the defendant in fact did father
the child in question. There are several possible methods of treating
such test results.
One resolution, formulated in understandable pique at a court's
refusal to admit any blood test results, would make the results of blood
tests in paternity proceedings equally admissible with like evidence of
blood types commonly admitted in criminal cases, that is, that the test
results be admitted regardless of their showing. 6 This solution is
questionable because of the fact that quite frequently paternity pro-
ceedings differ strategically from the ordinary criminal case to which
the commentator now analogizes. Consider one such leading case: de-
fendant was accused of rape, and one exhibit was his overcoat which
was smeared with type 0 blood. The prosecutrix likewise had blood
34. Weinreb, op. cit. supra note 14, at 1700. The rate of mutation has been
calculated at 1 in every 10,000 cases. See Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as
Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L. Riv. 466, 471 (1958). However, since the
uneven occurrence of these mutations in a given number of cases is an unknown, and
assuming that blood test results disagree with the mothers' allegations more than
once in every 10,000 cases, Ross concludes that ". . . the evidential weight of the
test is a function of the (unknown) average truthfulness of the mothers . . ." Id. at
476. The concept of truthfulness here must be leavened to mean good faith, since
mothers might be misinformed as well as deliberate liars.
35. See Miller v. Domanski, 26 N.J. Super. 316, 97 A.2d 641 (App. Div. 1953),
in which an expert testified that exclusion would have been shown by tests were it not
for the mother's unusual "seriologic makeup." The Court held no error in excluding
this testimony, and the finding of paternity was upheld.
36. Note, 43 YALE L.J. 651-52 (1934), criticizing State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123,
252 N.W. 7 (1933) ; Annot., 104 A.L.R. 430 (1933). A later opinion in the same
case, State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 209, 266 N.W. 667 (1936), ameliorates the doctrinal
harshness of the original opinion but then somewhat undercuts this result by implying
that in each case the proponent of blood test evidence will have to go through the
dreary process in the trial court of laying a foundation of the scientific acceptability
of blood test results.
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type 0. Defendant explained the bloodstains by stating that they were
the result of a fight with another girl, who it turned out, had blood type
A. Despite a logical hiatus in the conclusiveness of this proof (defend-
ant's blood type was unknown; it could have been type 0 also, and
the fight with the other girl could have accounted for its presence on
his coat) the court held no error in admitting this evidence for what-
ever weight it might contribute.8 On these facts, however, in addition
to whatever weight the blood-type evidence might have, there exists
the independent corroboration, by defendant's own admission, that he
was in an altercation with someone, and the jury could speculate whether
the blood was in fact defendant's or the prosecutrix's. In paternity
cases, however, particularly where defendant denies intercourse (as did
Chaplin) the only other corroborative evidence is quite likely to be
plaintiff's testimony. This coupled with admissible test results not
having a sufficiently high degree of probative weight seems unduly
prejudicial to defendant's case. Under the familiar A-B-AB-O sequence
of blood types, the range of probability can be narrowed, at best, to
thirteen per cent-and then only in some few cases-using the combined
frequency of the two less-prevalent blood types, AB and B, which occur
in three and ten per cent of the population respectively. For example,
if the child's blood type is B, and the mother's is 0 or A, the father's
must be B or AB, and we may conclude that only thirteen out of an
average of any one hundred men could have been the father. Much less
satisfactory results occur when the child and the alleged father have
blood type factors 0 or A or both present, since these two types repre-
sent forty-five and forty-two per cent of the population respectively. 38
In these situations where the blood test results do not unequivo-
cally exclude paternity, the Uniform Act likewise equivocates in the
guise of the second major contingency of section 4:
If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of
the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within
the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the
blood type. 9
One of the leading scholars in this/area seems to approve of the
above compromise provision: "In view of the probability that the
development of new, additional tests may further narrow the group in
37. Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 931(1945). But see Lane v. State, 172 A.2d 400, 404 (1961), cautioning that the evidence
in Shanks was admitted on the state's rebuttal.
38. Compare Dockery v. State, 114 So. 2d 394, 399 (1959) with Hendricks v.
State, 296 P.2d 205, 219 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1956).
39. UNIVORm AcT § 4.
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which the potential father must fall, the practice suggested in the Uni-
form Act seems an expedient solution.""0
Applying the Uniform Act's proposal to the A-B-AB-O blood
types, imagine the following situation in which the mother's blood
type is 0, the child's is A, and the defendant's is likewise type A. The
father must, on these facts, be either type A or AB or, in other words,
only forty-five out of every hundred average men could have fathered
this child. Since the probability of paternity is inversely proportionate
to the relative frequency of the blood type, the chances are slightly better
than even on the basis of these results that a defendant whose blood
type is either A or AB is in fact the father. Judicial discretion should
be exercised to exclude this evidence because its probative weight is
exceeded by its inflammatory nature.4 1 A case in which we know the
father must be either blood type B or AB or, in other words, only
thirteen out of an average of every one hundred men could have
fathered the child, presents a borderline situation if we know the de-
fendant's blood type is one of those two.4 2 Perhaps admissibility here
should turn on the corroborative effect of other evidence in the case,
but the Uniform Act's provision does specify that infrequency of the
blood types in question shall be determinative of admissibility, and it
could be implied that the criterion is intended to be an exclusive one.
It must be noted, however, that the A-B-AB-0 tests are only one of at
least three tests which are physiologically separate but which by cor-
relation of their independent results can perhaps reduce the possibilities
of paternity more than any one individual test. Therefore, it might be
possible to reduce the odds of a given defendant's paternity below the
thirteen per cent minimum provided by the A-B-AB-0 sequence alone.
Any such reduction of possibility could well influence a judge applying
the Uniform Act to exercise his discretion of favor of admissibility.
The Uniform Act's proposal has encountered divided legislative
acceptance. California and Pennsylvania did not enact the quoted por-
tion of section 4 ;43 Utah, as noted, specifically forbids such evidence ;44
Oregon, New Hampshire and the Canal Zone, on the contrary, enacted
the provision in haec verba.45 The view here is that the Utah provision
40. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCS § 178 (1954).
41. See People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 67 N.W.2d 230 (1954), a case in
which the court's language far outshadows its result; see text accompanying note 47
infra.
42. Here, however, McCormick would admit the evidence on the ground that it
"would be substantially corroborative of other evidence that he was the father... "
MCCORMICK, EVIDENC- § 178 (1954).
43. CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 1980.6; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 307.4 (Supp. 1962).
44. UTAH CoDm ANN. tit. 9, § 78-25-21 (Supp. 1963).
45. ORE. Rtv. STAT. tit. 11, § 109.258 (1961); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
ch. 522:4 (1955) ; C.Z. CoDE tit. 8, § 494 (1963).
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is the wisest, and that all blood test evidence not excluding the possi-
bility of paternity should be inadmissible, certainly when the facts are
tried before a jury. The contrary argument, that blood test results
showing a possibility of paternity should be admitted for their corrobor-
ative effect on other evidence in the case seems particularly weak because
so frequently there is a paucity of other evidence in the case, and what
other evidence there is-usually the female plaintiff's testimony-needs
no corroboration insofar as impressing the jury is concerned. We know
that juries are anxious to find defendants liable for paternity (in those
jurisdictions in which blood test results excluding paternity do not con-
clude the finder of fact) even though the jury is confronted with an
exclusionary test result.4' The absurdity of a case like Charles Chaplin's
is not that the jury found that he fathered Joan Berry's child even when
the blood tests unanimously concluded that this was impossible; it is
that an appellate court was compelled to allow this finding to stand.
This being so, it is submitted that since juries are willing to find patern-
ity even where the tests dictate the contrary, they will be even more
likely to find paternity where they have for consideration tests results
that indicate merely the possibility of paternity. This result is too prej-
udicial to defendants. In the language of the most complete judicial
discussion of the problem:
The jury was given to understand that the tests were made on
defendant's motion, to establish his non-paternity and that when
the results failed to do so he then objected to their admission into
evidence and sought to conceal them from the jury. The possible
psychological effect on the minds of the jurors cannot be ignored.
The use of scientific apparatus and tests and expert testimony as to
scientific results, placed before the jury with an instruction that
they should accord such weight thereto, bearing on the contro-
verted issue, as they might deem proper, could not have failed to
mislead the jurors into believing that this totally irrelevant evi-
dence might be considered as having probative value. The average
juryman is bound to be impressed by an array of scientific witnesses
under circumstances in which its utter irrelevancy is not made
clear, but, on the contrary, it is permitted to pose as relevant testi-
mony to be weighed by them. This was prejudicial to defendant. 7
To be sure, the court's language overstates the case. The evidence
involved a fact situation in which the percentages of defendant's pa-
ternity based upon non-exclusionary test results were slightly less than,
46. See Comment, 14 W. Rns. L. Riv. 115, 117 (1962). The tactic for a defen-
dant, therefore, is to eschew a jury trial. See State ex. rel. Steiger v. Gray, 145
N.E.2d 162 (Cuyahoga Co., Ohio Juv. Ct. 1957) in which five out of six different
blood test results were inconclusive; the sixth excluded the possibility of defen-
dant's paternity, whereupon the court acquitted him.
47. People v. Nichols, 67 N.W.2d 230, 232-33 (1954).
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one out of two. Hence the evidence carried a certain amount of logical
relevance. But there is substantial danger of confusion in trying to
explain to the jury the exact percentage of logical relevance that it did
have. Of course, in factual situations in which the likelihood of par-
entage becomes greater because of the rarity of the blood types yielding
the exclusionary result, the court's remarks about the logical relevancy
of such evidence arguably lose proportionate force, though a contrary
view holds that the irrelevance never diminishes, and would therefore
deny all corroborative force to such evidence:
What is of interest is the correctness with which the judge decides
in those cases in which he excludes an alleged paternity as incom-
patible with the blood-type system. Only in these cases can the
blood type test conceivably be used as evidence. When the mother's
declaration agrees with what is to be expected from the test-for
example, if a wife of blood type M and a husband of the same blood
type produce a child of type M-there is nothing prima facie
abnormal in the test results that could give rise to a dispute or
be used as evidence. 8
Notwithstanding, two other omnipresent dangers still remain. First,
the danger of confusing the fact-finder about the percentages of proba-
bility involved, a danger which is aggravated to the apotheosis by a sit-
uation in which blood test results are admissible for a duality of pur-
pose: first, to exclude plaintiff's non-party husband as the father of the
child and second, to show the possibility that the defendant could have
fathered the child, a more than theoretical possibility ;49 Secondly, the
prejudicial effect which such evidence will have.50 The incidence of
logical relevancy never overcomes these two factors to such a degree
that the percentages involved can safely be said to have legal relevance.
Nor has the female plaintiff's case been harmed irreparably by excluding
this evidence since, as noted, juries are all too willing to believe her
story despite exclusionary test results to the contrary. A jury likely to
reject conclusive evidence favorable to the alleged father would probably
be overly-prejudiced by non-conclusive evidence detrimental to him.
Any discussion in this area would be incomplete without some dis-
cussion of the age old presumption of legitimacy. The presumption sets
forth a fact-finding rule of thumb to the effect that when it is proven
that a married woman has given birth to a child, it will be determined as
a fact (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) that the woman's
husband fathered that child. The infinite varieties of human conduct can
48. Ross, supra note 34, at 473.
49. See State ex. rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 118 A.2d 596, 599 (1955).
50. See Note, 39 CAxrit. L. Rxv. 277, 279 (1951): "The prejudicial effects of
admitting in evidence the latter inconclusive result outweighs any possible proba-
tive value."
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pose challenging fact situations against which to juxtapose the above
rule,5 but the policy reasons behind the rule are said to be two-fold:
(1) to avoid stigmatizing the child socially and (2) to avoid that
jeopardization of the child's legal rights which would accompany a
declaration of his bastardy, though this last reason, it has been argued,
seems to have declining significance."2
. California and the Canal Zone have embellished the above pre-
sumption by the indisputable addition that a woman who conceives a
child while cohabiting with her husband forecloses all argument that
the husband is not the father. 13  The Uniform Act's section 5, by
contrast, provides:
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is
overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts,
as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, show that the
husband is not the father of the child. 54
This section codifies those cases which, though recognizing blood test
evidence as admissible and extraordinarily probative, and likewise rec-
ognizing the common-law presumption, have held that the former was
sufficient to conclusively rebut the latter.5 5 Of the jurisdictions adopt-
ing the Uniform Act, only Utah, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire
have enacted the above proviso.56 California, the Canal Zone, and
Oregon have not. Of course, had California and the Canal Zone in-
cluded this provision, it would not affect the rule that if the woman
cohabited with her husband at the time of conception the husband is
indisputably presumed to be the father, because that rule applies "Not-
withstanding any other provision of law .... -17 The real statutory
question presented is what effect the omission of the Uniform Act's
proviso would have upon the non-mandatory presumptions of legiti-
macy, that is, those situations in which a child is born during wedlock
51. E.g., where the woman conceives the child while married to one man but
gives birth to it while married to someone else. See sources cited in MCCORMICK,
EvIDENCZ § 309 n.31 (1954).
52. On the ground that statutes have alleviated the harsh common law rules
concerning the rights of bastards, see note 51 supra. Compare Ross, supra note 34,
at 482 n.22: "The courts in Denmark seem inclined to accept the blood-test ex-
clusion as unconditional and absolute proof in cases concerning children born out of
wedlock, despite contradictory testimony of the mother. On the other hand, the
courts have shown greater reluctance in cases concerning legitimate children, such
as divorce cases and cases concerning the status of the child." One might ask: Does
the diverse weight accorded blood-test results constitute a responsible action by the
fact-finder? Is it compatible with treating such situations as though they are worthy
of judicial notice, as has been suggested supra, note 33?
53. See note 6, supra. Contra, Anonymous v. Anonymous, I App. Div. 2d 312,
150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1956).
54. See note 3, supra.
55. See Haugen v. Swanson, 16 N.W.2d 900, 902 (1944).
56. UTAH CODz ANN. tit. 9, § 78-25-21 (Supp. 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,§ 307.5 (Supp. 1962) ; N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 522:5 (1955).
57. See note 5, supra.
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or within ten months after the dissolution of a marriage. Suggested
resolutions ranged from statements to the effect that the omission re-
stricted the statute's applicability to filiation proceedings" to proposals
which would admit the exclusionary blood test results to offset the non-
mandatory presumptions without according the tests conclusive effect.5"
The actual California solution was more dramatic: in cases where ex-
clusionary blood test results confront the non-mandatory presumptions,
the latter yield.6" Presumably, then, Oregon, which has no mandatory
presumptions in its statute, and assuming its blood test statute has
wider applicability than filiation proceedings,6 would follow suit.
Assuming that the earlier discussed policies of encouraging recon-
ciliation between the discordant spouses and prohibiting challenges to
long accepted family relationships have validity, it may be that restric-
tions should be placed upon blood test results which are submitted to
contradict the presumption of legitimacy. As noted before, in cases
where the support action follows a final divorce decree, a proportionately
smaller chance of jeopardizing the chance of marital reconciliation is
involved. Likewise, in cases where the alleged extra-marital mischief
which the husband suspects sired the spurious offspring occurred shortly
before the marriage's legal or social dissolution, the factor of a long
standing familial relationship insofar as the allegedly spurious child is
concerned would be absent. But where this interest may be discerned
to be protectible, particularly in situations where it appears coincident-
ally with the not yet concluded marital relationship, courts may wish to
exclude evidence offering a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy
by means of an estoppel doctrine emanating from the parties' mani-
festations to one another of their supposed relationship. Of course, the
court in deciding the Weston6 2 case took a much more circumscribed
view in denying the availability of the tests, not waiting until the
results were available before ruling that an estoppel came into play.
Curiously, the court observed that "It is the taking of the blood test,
and not the result of it, which does the harm.... Pricking the skin to
get the blood is an act which plants indelibly upon the mind of a child
the doubt as to its paternity which it will carry thereafter forever."6
58. McKee v. McKee, 156 Cal. App. 2d 764, 320 P.2d 510 (1958).
59. Note, 7 STAN. L. Rtv. 388, 393 n.26 (1955).
60. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960) ; see
Note, 48 CALip. L. Rev. 852, 855-57 (1960).
61. See note 8 supra. The Oregon Attorney General has said that the legislation
constitutes an adoption of the Uniform Act, but the opinion implies a limited appli-
cability to filiation proceedings. See 26 OPs. ATr'Y GMI. 233 (1954).
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Weston V. Weston, 193 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 1963).
(Two judges dissenting.)
63. Id. at 783.
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This view is an overstatement. It appears unlikely that the mere
taking of blood from two children, four years old and under, will in
and of itself disrupt the childrens' relationship with the husband of
its mother "forever." By contrast, it might be argued that in the situ-
ation where the still extant marital relationship is involved, it is the
mere demand for and taking of the blood test which does in fact produce
the disruptive result.
Judicial development of an estoppel doctrine in this context in-
volves the drawing of lines on a case to case basis with the inevitable
vagueness which would accompany the evolution of such a doctrine.
A possibility, perhaps more suitable for legislative evaluation, would
be to preclude a challenge to the presumption originating in a relation-
ship of the parties defined by pre-established statutory criteria, rather
than an ad hoc after the fact determination of the parties' manifesta-
tions toward one another.64 This suggestion has the attraction of being
harder contoured, so that parties will have a clearer idea in advance
about whether their relationship toward one another is or has been such
as to preclude a challenge to what they consider to be unpleasant facts.
These considerations, likewise apropos to the question of whether a liti-
gant should be entitled in the first place to demand a blood test under
the Uniform Act, are reiterated here in conjunction with a discussion
of the evidentiary effect of test results in the event some court-contrary
to the Superior Court in the Weston case-should think itself obligated
by the Uniform Act's provisions only to grant the litigant's demand for
a blood test, but not bound to accept the results into evidence after con-
sideration of the purposes for which the test results may be put to use
by such litigant.
64. See CAL. Civ. CODX § 195 (Supp. 1962): "The presumption of legitimacy
can be disputed only by the people of the State of California in a criminal action . . .
or the husband or wife, or the descendant of one or both of them. Illegitimacy, in
such case, may be proved like any other fact."
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APPENDIX
UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS
TO DETERMINE PATERNITY
§ 1. AUTHORITY FOR TEST.-In a civil action, in which paternity is a relevant fact,
the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any
persons whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the action made
at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child
and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any parties refuse to submit to such
tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce
its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
§ 2. SELECTION OF ExPERTs.-The tests shall be made by experts qualified as
examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be
called by the court as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to
cross-examination by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests
have been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which may be
offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts shall be deter-
mined by the court.
§ 3. COMPENSATION OF EXPERT WITNESsn.-The compensation of each expert
witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid
as the court shall order. The court may order that it be paid by the parties in such
proportions and at such times as' it shall prescribe, or that the proportion of any
party be paid by (insert name of the proper public authority), and that after pay-
ment by the parties or (insert name of the public authority), or both, all or part
or none of it be taxed as costs in the action. The fee of an expert witness called
by a party but not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but
shall not be taxed as costs in the action.
§ 4. EFFEc'r or TEST ResuLs.-If the court finds that the conclusions of all the
experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father
is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.
If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be sub-
mitted upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the
possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the
discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type.
§ 5. EFFEcT ON PRESUMPTION OF LrGITIMAcy.-The presumption of legitimacy of
a child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of
all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, show that the
husband is not the father of the child.
§6. APPLIcABILITY To CRIMINAL ACTION.-This act shall apply to criminal
cases subject to the following limitations and provisions: (a) An order for the
tests shall be made only upon application of a party or on the court's initiative; (b)
the compensation of the experts shall be paid by (insert name of proper public
authority) under order of court; (c) the court may direct a verdict of acquittal upon
the conclusions of all the experts under the provisions of Section 4, otherwise the
case shall be submitted for determination upon all the evidence.
§ 7. UNIFORMITY OF INTERPURTATION.-This act shall be so interpreted and con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
§ 8. SEV4RABnITY CLAUSX.-If any part of this act is declared invalid the re-
maining portion shall continue in full force and effect and shall be construed as being
the entire act.
§ 9. SHORT TiTLe.-This act may be cited as the Uniform Act on Blood Tests
to Determine Paternity.
§ 10. TIME oF TAKING Errac.-This act shall take effect .....................
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